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Abstract
The problem of secret sharing over the Gaussian wiretap channel is considered. A source and a
destination intend to share secret information over a Gaussian channel in the presence of a wiretapper
who observes the transmission through another Gaussian channel. Two constraints are imposed on the
source-to-destination channel; namely, the source can transmit only binary phase shift keyed (BPSK)
symbols, and symbol-by-symbol hard-decision quantization is applied to the received symbols of the
destination. An error-free public channel is also available for the source and destination to exchange
messages in order to help the secret sharing process. The wiretapper can perfectly observe all messages
in the public channel. It is shown that a secret sharing scheme that employs a random ensemble of regular
low density parity check (LDPC) codes can achieve the key capacity of the BPSK-constrained Gaussian
wiretap channel asymptotically with increasing block length. To accommodate practical constraints of
finite block length and limited decoding complexity, fixed irregular LDPC codes are also designed to
replace the regular LDPC code ensemble in the proposed secret sharing scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security schemes exploit channel characteristics, such as noise and fading, to allow a
group of nodes to share information in such a way that other unintended receivers (called eavesdroppers
or wiretappers) cannot recover that secret information. Physical-layer security has often been studied in
the context of the wiretap channel, which was first introduced by Wyner [1] and later refined by Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner [2]. In the wiretap channel, a source tries to send secret information to a destination at the
presence of a wiretapper. When the source-to-wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the source-to-
destination channel, Wyner [1] showed that the source can transmit a message at a positive (secrecy) rate
to the destination by taking advantage of the less “noisy” channel to the destination. The degradedness
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2condition was removed in [2], which showed that a positive secrecy rate is possible for the case where the
source-to-destination channel is “more capable” than the source-to-wiretapper channel. Generalization of
Wyner’s work to the Gaussian wiretap channel was considered in [3].
In Wyner’s original paper, a code design based on group codes was described for the wiretap channel.
In [4], a code design based on coset codes was suggested for the type-II (the destination channel is error
free) binary erasure wiretap channel. Recently, the authors of [5] constructed low density parity check
(LDPC) based wiretap codes for binary erasure channel (BEC) and binary symmetric channel (BSC).
Reference [6] considered the design of secure nested codes for type-II wiretap channels. More recently,
References [7] and [8] concurrently established the result that polar codes [9] can achieve the secrecy
capacity of the degraded binary-input symmetric-output (BISO) wiretap channels. Note that all these
designs are for codes with asymptotically large block lengths.
In some scenarios, it is sufficient for two nodes to agree upon a common secret (a key), instead of
having to send secret information from a source to a destination. Under this relaxed criterion, it is shown
in [10] that, with the use of a feedback channel, a positive key rate is achievable when the destination
and wiretapper channels are two conditionally independent (given the source input symbols) memoryless
binary channels, even if the destination channel is not more capable than the wiretapper’s channel. This
notion of secret sharing is formalized in [11] based on the concept of common randomness between the
source and destination. A three-phase process of achieving secret sharing over a wiretap channel with
an additional public channel between the source and destination is suggested in [10]. The three phases
are respectively advantage distillation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification. Advantage
distillation aims to provide the destination an advantage over the wiretapper. Information reconciliation
aims at generating an identical random sequence at both the source and destination. Privacy amplification
is the step that extracts a secret key from the identical random sequence agreed upon by the source and
destination.
Information reconciliation is probably the most studied and most essential part of any secret sharing
scheme. Perhaps the most well known practical application of reconciliation protocols is quantum cryp-
tography, where nonorthogonal states of a quantum system provide two terminals with observations of
correlated randomness which are at least partially secret from a potential eavesdropper. Many works [12]–
[18] have been devoted to the study of reconciliation for both discrete and continuous random variables
in quantum key distribution schemes. For the case of discrete random variables, Cascade is an iterative
reconciliation protocol first proposed by Brassard and Salvail in [12]. Recently, BSC-optimized LDPC
codes have been employed in [18] to reduce the interactivity and improve the efficiency of Cascade.
3On the other hand, the work on slice error correction [14], which converts continuous variables into
binary strings and makes use of interactive error correcting codes, is the first reconciliation protocol for
continuous random variables. Modern coding techniques like turbo codes [13] and LDPC codes [16],
[17] have also been directly applied within information reconciliation protocols for continuous random
variables.
Another application of reconciliation protocols is secret key agreement over wireless channels. An
LDPC code-based method of extracting secrecy from jointly Gaussian random sources generated by
a Rayleigh fading model has been studied in [16]. In [17], multilevel coding/multistage decoding-like
reconciliation with LDPC codes has been proposed for the quasi-static Rayleigh fading wiretap channel.
In [19], punctured LDPC codes were employed in a coding scheme for the Gaussian wiretap channel
to reduce the security gap, which expresses the quality difference between the destination channel and
wiretapper channel required to achieve a sufficient level of security. The main idea of this scheme is to
hide the information bits from the wiretapper by means of puncturing. In [20], further reductions in the
security gap are achieved using a reconciliation scheme based on non-systematic LDPC codes along with
scrambling of the information bits prior to encoding.
In this paper, we consider the problem of secret sharing over the Gaussian wiretap channel with the
constraints of binary phase-shift keyed (BPSK) source symbols and symbol-by-symbol hard-decision
quantization at the destination. Our main goal is to develop a coding structure based on which practical
“close-to-capacity” secret sharing (key agreement) codes can be constructed. Finite block length and
moderate encoder/decoder complexity are the two main practical constraints that we consider when
designing these codes. The secrecy performance of our designs will be measured by the rate of secret
information shared between the source and destination (which will be referred to as the key rate) as well
as the rate of information that is leaked to the wiretapper through all its observations of the wiretap and
public channels (which will be referred to as the leakage rate).
To rigorously gauge the secrecy performance of our code designs, we introduce the notion of relaxed
key capacity in Section II. The relaxed key capacity is the maximum key rate that can be achieved over
the wiretap channel provided that the leakage rate is bounded below a fixed value. In Section III, we
calculate the relaxed key capacities over the BPSK source-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel with
and without the constraint of hard-decision quantization at the destination. In Section IV, we present a
secret sharing scheme employing an ensemble of regular LDPC codes for the BPSK-constrained Gaussian
wiretap channel with hard-decision quantization at the destination. We prove that the proposed scheme
achieves the relaxed key capacity with asymptotically large block length. We note that a similar LDPC-
4based key agreement scheme employing observations of correlated discrete stationary sources at the
source, destination, and wiretapper was studied in [15]. A more detailed comparison between our scheme
and the one proposed in [15] is also provided in Section IV. The asymptotic result in Section IV provides
us a reasonable theoretical justification to design practical secret sharing schemes based on the proposed
coding structure. We propose in Section V to replace the regular LDPC code ensemble in Section IV by
fixed LDPC codes that are more amenable to practical implementation. In the same section, we describe
a code search algorithm based on density evolution analysis to obtain good irregular LDPC codes for the
proposed secret sharing scheme. We also compare the secrecy performance achieved by these irregular
LDPC codes, BSC-optimized irregular LDPC codes, and some standard regular LDPC codes against the
relaxed key capacity calculated in Section III. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SECRET SHARING AND RELAXED KEY CAPACITY
We start by reviewing the framework of secret sharing proposed in [11]. The objective of secret
sharing is for the source and destination to share secret information, which is obscure to the wiretapper,
by exploiting common randomness [11] available to them through the wiretap channel. Here, we consider
the wiretap channel to be memoryless and specified by the conditional probability density function (pdf)
pY,Z|X(y, z|x). When the symbol X is sent by the source, Y and Z denote the corresponding symbols
observed by the destination and wiretapper, respectively. In addition, we restrict ourselves to cases in
which Y and Z are conditionally independent given X , i.e., pY,Z|X(y, z|x) = pY |X(y|x)pZ|X(z|x). This
restriction is satisfied by the Gaussian wiretap channel considered in Section III and some other wireless
wiretap channels [21]. For convenience, we will refer to the wiretap channel by the triple (X,Y, Z).
In addition to the wiretap channel, there is an interactive, authenticated, public channel with unlimited
capacity between the source and destination. The source and destination can communicate via the public
channel without any power or rate restriction. The wiretapper can perfectly observe all communications
over the public channel but cannot tamper with the transmitted messages.
The aforementioned common randomness is to be extracted by a proper combination of transmission
from the source to the destination through the wiretap channel (X,Y, Z) and information exchanges
between them over the public channel. To this end, we consider the class of permissible secret sharing
strategies suggested in [11]. Consider t time instants labeled by 1, 2, . . . , t, respectively. The wiretap
channel is used n times during these t time instants at i1 < i2 < · · · < in. Set in+1 = t. The public
channel is used during the other (t−n) time instants. Before the secret sharing process starts, the source
and destination generate, respectively, independent random variables MX and MY . Then a permissible
5strategy proceeds as follows:1
• At time instant 0 < i < i1, the source sends message Φi = Φi(MX ,Ψi−1) to the destination, and
the destination sends message Ψi = Ψi(MY ,Φi−1) to the source. Both transmissions are carried
over the public channel.
• At time instant i = ij for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the source sends the symbol Xj = Xj(MX ,Ψij−1) to
the wiretap channel. The destination and wiretapper observe the corresponding symbols Yj and Zj .
There is no message exchange via the public channel, i.e., Φi and Ψi are both null.
• At time instant ij < i < ij+1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the source sends message Φi = Φi(MX ,Ψi−1)
to the destination, and the destination sends message Ψi = Ψi(MY , Y j ,Φi−1) to the source. Both
transmissions are carried over the public channel.
At the end of the t time instants, the source generates its secret key K = K(MX ,Ψt), and the destination
generates its secret key L = L(MY , Y n,Φt), where K and L take values from the same finite set K.
Slightly extending the achievable key rate definition in [11], for Rl ≥ 0, we call (R,Rl) an achievable
key-leakage rate pair through the wiretap channel (X,Y, Z) if for every ε > 0, there exists a permissible
secret sharing strategy of the form described above such that
1) Pr{K 6= L} < ε,
2) 1nI(K; Φ
t,Ψt) < ε,
3) 1nI(K;Z
n|Φt,Ψt) < Rl + ε,
4) 1nH(K) > R− ε, and
5) 1n log2 |K| < 1nH(K) + ε,
for sufficiently large n. Condition 2 restricts that the public messages (the messages conveyed through the
public channel) contain a negligible rate of information about the key, while Condition 3 limits to Rl the
rate of key information that the wiretapper can extract from its own channel observations and the public
messages. Note that Condition 3 is trivially satisfied if Rl ≥ 1n log2 |K|. We also note that Conditions 2
and 3 combine to essentially give the original condition 1nI(K;Z
n,Φt,Ψt) < ε of the achievable key
rate definition in [11] when Rl = 02. For the cases in which the alphabet of X is not finite, we also
1Throughout the paper, Ai stands for the sequence of symbols A1, A2, . . . , Ai, and A0 is null.
2When Rl > 0, if the combined condition 1nI(K;Z
n,Φt,Ψt) < Rl + ε is employed instead of Conditions 2 and 3, then it
is easy to see that if (R,Rl) is an achievable key-leakage rate pair, (R+ r,Rl + r) is also achievable, for any r ≥ 0, by simply
transmitting the additional key information (of rate r) through the public channel. Separating the two conditions as suggested
avoids such artificial consequence of the combined condition.
6impose the following power constraint to the symbol sequence Xn sent out by the source:
1
n
n∑
j=1
|Xj |2 ≤ P (1)
with probability one (w.p.1) for sufficiently large n. We note that the idea of key-leakage rate pair is
similar to that of the secrecy-equivocation rate pair originally defined in [1].
The Rl-relaxed key capacity is defined as the maximum value of R such that (R,Rl) is an achievable
key-leakage rate pair. The main reason for us to introduce the notion of relaxed key capacity is to employ
it as a gauge to measure the performance of practical codes that will be presented in Section V. Since
these codes have finite block lengths and are to be decoded by the belief propagation (BP) algorithm,
they do not achieve zero leakage rate. Thus using the relaxed key capacity provides a more suitable
comparison than using the original “straight” key capacity in [11]. Also, since these practical codes
do not give zero leakage rate, their use could be considered as an information-reconciliation step. The
secrecy performance could be further improved by additional privacy amplification.
For wiretap channels that satisfy the aforementioned conditional independence requirement, we have
the following result, whose proof is sketched in Appendix I:
Theorem 1: The Rl-relaxed key capacity of the memoryless wiretap channel (X,Y, Z) with conditional
pdf p(y, z|x) = p(y|x)p(z|x) is given by
CK(Rl) = max
X:E[|X|2]≤P
[min{I(X;Y )− I(Y ;Z) +Rl, I(X;Y )}] .
We employ this result to calculate the relaxed key capacities of the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap
channel in the next section.
III. BPSK-CONSTRAINED GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
Hereafter, we focus on the Gaussian wiretap channel, in which the source-to-destination channel and
source-to-wiretapper channel are both additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. We restrict the
source to transmit only BPSK symbols. More specifically, let Xi ∈ {±1} be the ith transmit symbol from
the source3, and let Yi and Zi be the corresponding received symbols at the destination and wiretapper,
respectively. The Gaussian wiretap channel can then be modeled as
Yi = βXi +Ni
Zi = αβXi + N˜i,
(2)
3In later sections, whenever appropriate, we implicitly employ the mapping +1 → 0 and −1 → 1, where 0 and 1 are the
two usual elements in GF(2).
7where Ni and N˜i are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random variables of variance σ2. Note that β is the gain
of the BPSK symbols transmitted by the source. By the source power constraint (1), we have β2 ≤ P .
Also, α is a positive constant that models the gain advantage of the wiretapper over the destination. Let
the normalized gain β˜ = β/σ. Then, the received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the destination and
wiretapper are β˜2 and α2β˜2, respectively. Clearly, the Gaussian wiretap channel satisfies the memoryless
and conditional independent properties required in Theorem 1. Specializing Theorem 1 to the BPSK-
constrained Gaussian wiretap channel, it is not hard to show4 that the Rl-relaxed key capacity is given
by
Cb(Rl) = max
0≤β˜≤
√
P
σ2
{
min
{
1
2pi
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
H2
(
1 + e−2β˜y · e−2αβ˜z
[1 + e−2β˜y][1 + e−2αβ˜z]
)[
1 + e−2β˜y
] [
1 + e−2αβ˜z
]
· exp
[
−(y − β˜)
2
2
− (z − αβ˜)
2
2
]
dydz +Rl, 1
}
− 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
0
H2
(
1
1 + e−2β˜y
)(
1 + e−2β˜y
)
exp
[
−(y − β˜)
2
2
]
dy
}
(3)
where H2(p) = −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2(1 − p) is the binary entropy function. We note that Cb(Rl) is
achieved when Xi is equiprobable; but it is not necessarily achieved by transmitting at the maximum
allowable power P .
The achievability proof of Theorem 1 (cf. Appendix I) employs random Wyner-Ziv coding, in which
the received symbols at the destination need to be quantized due to the fact that the channel alphabet
at the destination in the Gaussian wiretap channel is continuously distributed. In this paper, we consider
a simple symbol-by-symbol hard-decision quantization scheme in which the ith quantized destination
symbol Y˜i = sgn(Yi), where sgn is the signum function. Note that this quantization is suboptimal and
leads to a loss in key capacity. We quantify this loss by applying Theorem 1 to the BPSK-constrained
Gaussian wiretap channel with hard-decision quantization at the destination to calculate the relaxed-Rl
key capacity Cbq(Rl). Using the standard notation Q(x) =
∫∞
x
e−u
2/2√
2pi
du, it is not hard to establish4 that
Cbq(Rl) = max
0≤β˜≤
√
P
σ2
[
min{Cs(β˜)− Cw(β˜) +Rl, Cs(β˜)}
]
, (4)
4The proofs of (3) and (4) can be easily, though rather tediously, established by checking the concavity and symmetry of
I(X;Y )− I(Y ;Z) as a function of the binary source distribution in the respective cases.
8where
Cs(β˜) = 1−H2(Q(β˜)) (5)
Cw(β˜) = 1− 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
0
H2
(
Q(β˜) + [1−Q(β˜)]e−2αβ˜z
1 + e−2αβ˜z
)
[1 + e−2αβ˜z]e−
(z−αβ˜)2
2 dz. (6)
are respectively the capacities of the quantized-destination-to-source and quantized-destination-to-wiretapper
channels at the normalized gain β˜. Like before, Cbq(Rl) is achieved when Xi is equiprobable; but it is
not necessarily achieved by transmitting at the maximum allowable power P . To visualize the loss in
key capacity, Fig. 1 shows Cb(Rl) and Cbq(Rl) versus the maximum allowable SNR (P/σ2) for different
values of Rl. We can see that the loss in key capacity due to the hard-decision quantization is no more
than 0.07 bits per (wiretap) channel use for the cases shown.
IV. SECRET SHARING SCHEME EMPLOYING REGULAR LDPC CODE ENSEMBLES
The achievability proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix I employs a secret sharing scheme with random
Wyner-Ziv coding. For the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel with destination hard-decision
quantization, we show in this section that a secret sharing scheme that employs a properly constructed
ensemble of regular LDPC codes can also asymptotically achieve the Rl-relaxed key capacity. We will
design practical secret sharing schemes for the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel in Section V
based on the LDPC coding structure proposed here.
To start describing the proposed secret sharing scheme, let us consider an (n, l) binary linear block
code C with 2l distinct codewords of length n and an (l − k)-dimensional subspace W in C. The pair
(C,W) defines what we call an (n, l, k) secret sharing binary linear block code. Given any such (C,W)
pair, let K be the quotient of C by W . Then K is a linear space of 2k distinct cosets of the form xˆn+W ,
where xˆn ∈ C. We will use the coset index in K as the secret key. We will see later that the ordering of
the cosets in K is immaterial. The ratios Rc = ln and Rk = kn will be referred to as the code rate and
key rate of the (n, l, k) secret sharing binary linear block code, respectively.
Next, we consider the following random ensemble of (n, l, k) secret sharing binary linear block codes:
• The (n, l) linear block code C is chosen uniformly from the ensemble of (dv, dc)-regular LDPC codes
considered in [22]. That is, we consider that C is chosen uniformly from the set of all bipartite graphs
[23] with n degree-dv variable nodes and n− l degree-dc check nodes.
• The subspace W is chosen uniformly over the set of all possible (l − k)-dimensional subspaces in
C.
9Note that a realization of the randomly chosen C may actually have 2l′ distinct codewords, where l′ > l.
In such case, K will be of dimension k+ l′− l; so the actual key rate will be larger than Rk. Hence, we
can conservatively assume C is always an (n, l) linear code with 2l distinct codewords to simplify the
notation below.
Consider the following secret sharing scheme:
1) Random source transmission and destination quantization: The source randomly generates a
sequence Xn of n i.i.d. equally likely BPSK symbols and transmits them consecutively over the
Gaussian wiretap channel (X,Y, Z). The destination receives the sequence Y n and obtains the
quantized sequence Y˜ n by performing symbol-by-symbol hard-decision quantization on Y n, i.e.,
Y˜j = sgn(Yj). This quantization effectively turns the source-to-destination channel into a BSC,
whose cross-over probability depends on the SNR of the original source-to-destination channel.
We note that the wiretapper also observes Zn through the source-to-wiretapper channel.
2) Syndrome generation through LDPC encoding at destination: The next step is for the destination
to feed a compressed version of Y˜ n back to the source through the public channel so that the source
can resolve the differences between Xn and Y˜ n. This is similar to the problem of compressing
an equiprobable memoryless binary source with side information using LDPC codes considered
in [24]. More precisely, the destination selects (C,W) randomly from the ensemble of secret sharing
(dv, dc)-regular LDPC codes described above. It then generates the syndrome sequence Sn−l =
Y˜ nHT , where H is a parity check matrix of C. We note that each Sn−l uniquely corresponds to
a coset EnS + C. Further, the destination determines which coset in K that Xn0 = Y˜ n + EnS ∈ C
belongs. Denote that coset by Xˆn0 +W . Finally, the destination sends EnS , C, and W back to the
source via the public channel.
3) Decoding at source: The source then tries to decode for Xn0 from observing Xn and EnS according
to (C,W). Treating Xn + EnS as a noisy version of Xn0 , it performs maximum likelihood (ML)
decoding to obtain a codeword in C and then determines which coset in K that the decoded codeword
belongs. Denote that coset by Xˆn +W .
4) Key generation at source and destination: The destination sets its key L to be index of Xˆn0 +W
in K. Similarly, the source sets its key K to be the index of Xˆn +W in K.
It is clear that this secret sharing scheme is permissible. Indeed, under the notation of Section II, for the
proposed secret sharing scheme, t = n + 1, ij = j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, MX = Xn, MY = (C,W), and
Ψn+1 = (E
n
S , C,W) is the only message sent via the public channel. Hence, we can evaluate the secrecy
10
performance of the scheme in the context of its achievable key rate defined in Section II as follows.
First, based on the linearity of LDPC codes, the memoryless nature of the Gaussian wiretap channel,
the chosen distribution of Xn, and the symbol-by-symbol hard decision performed to obtain Y˜ n at
the destination, it is easy to check that H(Y˜ n) = n, H(EnS |C,W) = n − l, H(L|C,W) = k, and
I(L;EnS |C,W) = 0. Then,
0 ≤ I(L;EnS , C,W) = I(L; C,W) = H(L)−H(L|C,W) ≤ k − k = 0.
Hence, I(L;EnS , C,W) = 0, I(L; C,W) = 0, and H(L) = k. If the decoding process at the source
achieves the ensemble average error probability ¯s, then we have Pr{K 6= L} ≤ ¯s. Thus, H(K|L) ≤
1 + k¯s and H(L|K) ≤ 1 + k¯s by Fano’s inequality. That in turn implies
1
n
I(K;EnS , C,W) =
1
n
[I(L;EnS , C,W) + I(K;EnS , C,W|L)− I(L;EnS , C,W|K)]
≤ 1
n
I(K;EnS , C,W|L) ≤
1
n
H(K|L) ≤ Rk ¯s + 1
n
and
1
n
H(K) =
1
n
[H(L) +H(K|L)−H(L|K)] ≥ Rk −Rk ¯s − 1
n
. (7)
Hence, Conditions 2 and 5 in Section II are satisfied when n is sufficiently large if ¯s can be made
arbitrarily small. Similarly,
I(K;Zn, EnS , C,W)
= I(L;Zn, EnS , C,W) + I(K;Zn, EnS , C,W|L)− I(L;Zn, EnS , C,W|K)
≤ I(L;Zn, EnS , C,W) + I(K;Zn, EnS , C,W|L)
≤ I(L;Zn, EnS , C,W) +H(K|L)
≤ I(L;Zn, EnS , C,W) + k¯s + 1
= I(L;Zn, EnS |C,W) + k¯s + 1, (8)
where the last line is due to the fact that I(L; C,W) = 0. Here,
I(L;Zn, EnS |C,W)
= H(L|C,W) +H(EnS |Zn, C,W)−H(L,EnS |Zn, C,W)
= H(L|C,W) +H(EnS |Zn, C,W) +H(Y˜ n|Zn, L,EnS , C,W)−H(L,EnS , Y˜ n|Zn, C,W)
≤ H(L|C,W) +H(EnS |C,W) +H(Y˜ n|Zn, L,EnS)−H(Y˜ n|Zn, C,W)
= H(L|C,W) +H(EnS |C,W) +H(Y˜ n|Zn, L,EnS)−H(Y˜ n) + I(Y˜ n;Zn), (9)
11
where the last equality follows from the fact that (Y˜ n, Zn) is independent of (C,W). Also I(Y˜ n;Zn) =
nI(Y˜ ;Z) = nCw(β˜) because of the memoryless nature of the channel from Y˜ n and Zn and of the
fact that the Pr(Y˜ = +1) = Pr(Y˜ = −1) = 0.5 achieves the capacity of this channel. Moreover,
consider a fictitious receiver at wiretapper trying to decode for Y˜ n from observing Zn, EnS , and Xˆ
n
0 (or
L equivalently). Suppose that the ensemble average error probability achieved by this receiver, employing
ML decoding, is ¯w. Then we have H(Y˜ n|Zn, L,EnS) ≤ 1+(l−k)¯w again by Fano’s inequality. Putting
all these and (9) back into (8), we obtain
1
n
I(K;Zn|EnS , C,W) ≤
1
n
I(K;Zn, EnS , C,W)
≤ Cw(β˜)− (Rc −Rk) +Rk ¯s + (Rc −Rk)¯w + 2
n
. (10)
The preceding secrecy analysis of the proposed secret sharing scheme based on the secret sharing
regular LDPC code ensembles allow us to arrive at the following result:
Theorem 2: Fix β˜ > 0. Suppose that Cw(β˜) ≤ Rc ≤ Cs(β˜). For any Rl ≥ 0, choose Rk = min{Rc−
Cw(β˜) + Rl, Rc}. Then (Rk, Rl) is an achievable key-leakage rate pair through the BPSK-constrained
Gaussian wiretap channel with symbol-by-symbol hard-decision destination quantization. Moreover, this
rate pair can be achieved by the aforementioned secret sharing scheme using the secret sharing (dv, dc)-
regular LDPC code ensemble described before when n increases.
Proof: First, suppose that Rc < Cs(β˜) and Rl > 0. Since Rc ≥ Cw(β˜), Rk > 0. Then Rc −Rk =
max{Cw(β˜) − Rl, 0} < Cw(β˜). Thus, by (10), if we can show that there is a pair (dv, dc) such that
Rc = 1 − dvdc , and both ¯s and ¯w in the preceding discussion vanish as n increases, then Condition 3
in Section II will be satisfied when n is sufficiently large. From the preceding discussion, Conditions
1, 2, and 5 will also be satisfied. Comparing (7) and Condition 4, we see then that (Rk, Rl) will be an
achievable key-leakage pair. The existence of such pair (dv, dc) results from the following lemma, whose
proof is an adaptation of the arguments in [25, Theorem 3] to the proposed secret sharing (dv, dc)-regular
LDPC code ensemble. The details are presented in Appendix II.
Lemma 1: Consider the ensemble average error probabilities ¯w and ¯s achieved by the respective
ML decoders at the source and wiretapper of the secret sharing (dv, dc)-regular LDPC code ensemble
mentioned above. For any fixed β˜ > 0, suppose that Rc < Cs(β˜) and Rc − Rk < Cw(β˜). Then, there
exists a choice of (dv, dc) such that
1) Rc = 1− dvdc ,
2) ¯w decreases exponentially (polynomially) with increasing n for Rk > 0 (for Rk = 0), and
3) ¯s decreases polynomially with increasing n.
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Finally, note that the before-imposed restrictions Rc < Cs(β˜) and Rl > 0 can be removed since the
key-leakage rate region is closed.
A comparison of Theorem 2 and (4) shows that the restriction to the secret sharing regular LDPC code
ensemble described in this section does not reduce the relaxed key capacity of the BPSK-constrained
Gaussian wiretap channel with destination hard-decision quantization.
As mentioned in Section I, a similar LDPC-based secret-key agreement scheme employing observations
of correlated discrete stationary sources at the source, destination, and wiretapper was studied in [15].
After Step 1) of our proposed secret sharing scheme, the observations Xn, Y˜ n, and Zn at the three
terminals can be viewed as generated from correlated sources; thus reducing our model to the one
considered in [15]5, except that the wiretapper alphabet is continuous in our case. As in our scheme,
the scheme in [15] has the syndrome Sn−l of Y˜ n sent to the source. On the other hand, the key in [15]
is obtained by calculating the syndrome of Y˜ n with respect to another independently selected LDPC
code. The scheme in [15] is shown to achieve key capacity via a similar approach as ours. First, the
consideration of leakage information is converted to that of the error probabilities achieved by decoders
at the source and wiretapper by an upper bound similar to (10) for a pair of fixed LDPC codes (cf.
Eqn. (11)). Then, the existence of a fixed code pair with vanishing error probabilities is shown via an
ML decoding error analysis of the code ensemble based on the method of types [26]. Because of the
continuous wiretapper alphabet, the ML decoding error analysis in [15] does not directly apply to our
case. Hence, we have opted for the combined union and Shulman-Feder bounding technique in [25],
which does however require the BISO nature of the channel from the (quantized) destination to the
wiretapper. Obviously, Lemma 1 also implies the existence of a fixed (C,W) from the secret sharing
regular LDPC ensemble with vanishing decoding errors in our design, and hence the use of this fixed
(C,W) is also sufficient to achieve the relaxed key capacity in our case.
Expressed in our notation, elements in the LDPC code ensemble of [15] are also of the form (C,W).
For our ensemble, W is (conditionally) uniformly distributed over the set of all subspaces of a given
C. For the ensemble of [15], W is (conditionally) uniformly distributed over the set of subspaces of C
specified by the concatenation of the parity matrices of C and another properly chosen regular LDPC
code. While each element in the ensemble of [15] is also an element of our ensemble, the two ensembles
are different since the respective (conditional) uniform distributions for W are defined over two different
5Our destination and source correspond to the sender and receiver in [15], respectively. For convenience, we employ our
terminology here when referring to the scheme in [15].
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sets of subspaces. In a sense, the ensemble of [15] is more restrictive since W also needs to be an LDPC
code. The discussion in this section shows that the LDPC structure needs to be imposed only on C but
not onW . This bears significance in the design of practical codes because the design based on one LDPC
structure derived from our ensemble is much simpler, as will be illustrated in the following section.
V. SECRET SHARING SCHEME EMPLOYING PRACTICAL LDPC CODES
In practice, it is not realistic to employ the secret sharing regular LDPC code ensemble and ML
decoding at the source as suggested in Section IV, for even moderate values of n. In this section, we
investigate the secrecy performance of a secret sharing scheme similar to the one suggested in Section IV,
but with fixed choices of (C,W) from the secret sharing regular LDPC code ensemble and more-practical
BP decoding. In addition, from the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix II, the values of dv and dc need to
be large in order for the ensemble average error probabilities ¯w and ¯s to decrease with n, and hence to
achieve the relaxed key capacity. As large values of dv and dc increase the graph complexity of a LDPC
code, and hence the complexity of BP decoding, we have to limit ourselves to small values of dv and
dc. To alleviate the shortcoming of regular LDPC codes with small dv and dc, we also consider the use
of more-efficient irregular LDPC codes in the proposed secret sharing scheme.
We consider the secret sharing scheme described in Section IV, except that the secret sharing code
(C,W) is fixed and is known to the source and destination (and also the wiretapper) beforehand. Here, we
consider the (fixed) code C chosen from ensembles of regular and irregular LDPC codes. The details will
be discussed later. For convenience in the key generation step (and later in the search of good irregular
LDPC codes), the subspace W is chosen as follows. Referring back to Step 2) of the scheme, choose
a lower triangular version6 of H , for example by performing Gaussian elimination on the connection
matrix of the bipartite graph of C as discussed in [27]. Hence, H = [A,B] where B is an (n− l)×(n− l)
lower triangular matrix. Write Y˜ n = [dl, en−l] where dl and en−l are row vectors containing l and n− l
elements, respectively. Then the syndrome Sn−l = dlAT + en−lBT , codeword Xn0 = [dl, dlAT (B−1)T ]
and coset leader EnS = [0
T , Sn−l(B−1)T ]. Note that dl contains the systematic bits of the codeword
Xn0 while d
lAT (B−1)T contains the parity bits. The subspace W is chosen to be the set of codewords
obtained by setting the first k bits7 in the vector dl above to zero. The quotient space K is isomorphic
to the set of codewords obtained by setting the last l − k bits in the vector dl to zero. Hence we can
6We can, without loss of generality, assume H to be of full rank as discussed before. Alternatively, an approximate lower
triangular version of H as described in [27] can also be used if efficient encoding is needed.
7It is easy to see that the secrecy performance is the same for any choice of k bits in dl for the BP decoders described below.
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use the first k bits in dl as the key. Since (C,W) is known to the source beforehand, there is no need to
feed it back to the source via the public channel in Step 2) of the secret sharing scheme. Step 3) of the
scheme is modified to replace ML decoding by the practical BP decoding.
First, it is unlikely that the above fixed choice of W results in an LDPC code. Hence, the fixed coding
scheme suggested here is different from that of [15]. Second, the secrecy analysis of Section IV can be
easily modified to reflect the use of the fixed secret sharing code (C,W) mentioned above. In particular,
the upper bound on the leakage rate in (10) becomes
1
n
I(K;Zn|EnS) ≤ Cw(β˜)− (Rc −Rk) +Rks + (Rc −Rk)w +
2
n
, (11)
where s and w are now the error probabilities achieved by the BP decoders at the source and wiretapper,
respectively. Since the bound above is derived from Fano’s inequality, it applies for any decoder (ML,
BP, etc.), and the value of the bound depends on the choices of decoders only through s and w. Below,
we perform computer simulation to estimate s and w and then employ (11) to bound the leakage rates
achieved by (C,W) constructed from different choices of finite block length LDPC codes as described
above. More specifically, suppose that the key rate of a secret sharing LDPC code (C,W) is Rk and s
obtained from simulation is small. By setting Rl to be the value of the bound (11) obtained as described,
then (Rk, Rl) will be considered a key-leakage rate pair achievable by (C,W).
A. Secret sharing regular LDPC codes
We start by evaluating the secrecy performance of using regular LDPC codes with small dv and dc
in the secret sharing scheme described above. First, we pick C from the rate-0.25 (3, 4)-regular LDPC
code ensemble by realizing the random bipartite graph experiment described in [22] and then remove
all length-4 loops in the realization. The block length n of the LDPC code is set to 105. As mentioned
above, we need to estimate the values of s and w from computer simulation. To get s, BP decoding
is implemented at the source. Similarly, a BP decoder is implemented for the fictitious receiver at the
wiretapper to obtain w. In order to provide information about L to the latter decoder, the intrinsic log-
likelihood ratios (LLRs) of the first k elements in dl, which are associated with L, are explicitly set to
±∞ according to the true bit values. While this method may not be the optimal way to feed information
of L to the BP decoder, we choose to employ it because of its simplicity and the fact that this method
also allows simple density evolution analysis, which will be used to search for good irregular LDPC
codes in Section V-B below.
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Fig. 2 shows the trajectory of (Rk, Rl) achievable by the rate-0.25 secret sharing (3, 4)-regular LDPC
code (C,W) when the maximum allowable SNR P/σ2 is limited to −0.15 dB and α2 = 0 dB. Different
values of Rk on the trajectory shown are obtained by varying the value of k (i.e., the dimension of W
also changes). When obtaining each shown pair (Rk, Rl), we choose β˜2, up to P/σ2, such that s ≤ 0.01,
w ≤ 0.01 and the bound in (11) is minimized. For any so-obtained pair (Rk, Rl) located to the right of
the 45◦ line in Fig. 2, the bound (11) becomes too loose, and the pair is not plotted. From Fig. 2, we
observe that the pair (Rk, Rl) = (0.2, 0.139) gives the smallest (bound on) leakage rate that is achievable
by the rate-0.25 secret sharing (3, 4)-regular LDPC code in the proposed scheme.
Next, we try to compare the secrecy performance of our secret sharing scheme to that of [15]. As
discussed near the end of Section IV, the scheme of [15] requires a pair of independently chosen regular
LDPC codes. Since no practical code designs or examples are provided in [15], we choose an LDPC code
pair for the scheme of [15] that is similar to the choice of our secret sharing code above for comparison.
For the scheme of [15], the first LDPC code is set to be C above (i.e., the rate-0.25 (3, 4)-regular LDPC
code). The other code C′ (from which the secret key is generated) is chosen independently from another
regular LDPC code ensemble such that a desired key rate Rk is resulted (cf. [5]). Note that only a few
values of Rk are possible if dv and dc are restricted to have small values. Again, as discussed near the end
of Section IV, the pair (C, C′) can be expressed in our (C,W) notation. As such, the LDPC subcode W
is obtained from concatenating parity-check matrices of C and C′. Note that W is in general an irregular
LDPC code. To clearly distinguish between our scheme and the one of [15] in the discussion below, we
will employ the notation (C, C′) when referring to the latter. The bound (11) is employed to determine
the rate pairs (Rk, Rl) that can be achieved by (C, C′), same as described before.
Under the parameter setting above (P/σ2 = −0.15 dB, α2 = 0 dB, and n = 105), we are not able to
find a choice of C′ (with small dv and dc) that satisfies the requirement w ≤ 0.01. In order to illustrate
the comparison between the two schemes, we increase the value of P/σ2 to 2.0 dB. For this case, we
pick C to be a rate-0.4 (3, 5)-regular LDPC code. The (Rk, Rl)-trajectory achieved by our secret sharing
scheme with (C,W) is overlaid in Fig. 2. We see that the lowest leakage rate achieved by this choice of
(C,W) is at the pair (Rk, Rl) = (0.22, 0.173). For the scheme of [15], picking C′ to be an (1, 3)-regular
LDPC code, the pair (C, C′) achieves the key-leakage rate pair (Rk, Rl) = (0.333, 0.286) as shown by the
square symbol in Fig. 2. This value of Rl is the lowest that we can obtain from picking many different
C′ with small dv and dc.
Summarizing the above results, our secret sharing scheme outperforms the scheme of [15] when the
respective code employed in each scheme is restricted among the choices of regular LDPC codes with
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small node degrees and finite block lengths. However, we can observe that there is a significant gap
between the (Rk, Rl) pairs achieved by the proposed scheme and the maximally achievable (Cbq, Rl)
key-leakage pair boundary. This illustrates that regular LDPC codes with small dv and dc and finite block
length do not provide good secret sharing performance.
B. Secret sharing irregular LDPC codes
To improve secret sharing performance, we search for “good” irregular LDPC codes to be used as C in
the proposed scheme. The structure of secret sharing code (C,W) described in the beginning of this section
facilitates the code search process because only the LDPC structure of C needs to be optimized. Such
optimization can be performed by employing the density-evolution based linear programming technique
suggested in [28]. The search objective is to find an irregular LDPC secret-sharing code (C,W) with
maximum Rc, given a fixed Rk such that both the decoding error probabilities s and w in (11) are
vanishing as the BP decoders iterate. By (11), this results in minimization of the bound on Rl for the
fixed Rk.
Using standard notation, let the variable and check node degree distribution polynomials of an irregular
LDPC code ensemble be, respectively, λ(x) =
∑dv
i=2 λix
i−1 and ρ(x) =
∑dc
i=2 ρix
i−1, where λi(ρi)
represents the fraction of edges emanating from the variable (check) nodes of degree i. We are to design
an irregular LDPC code C and its subcode W that work well for the channel from the (quantized)
destination to source and the channel from the (quantized) destination to wiretapper, corresponding to
the error probabilities s and w, respectively. Fix ρ(x), and let es(`) and ew(`) denote the bit error
probabilities obtained by the BP decoders at the source and wiretapper, respectively, at the `th density
evolution iteration [22], [28] when an initial λ˜(x) =
∑dv
i=2 λ˜ix
i−1 is used. Now, let A`,j denote the bit
error probability obtained at the source by running the density evolution for ` iterations, in which λ˜(x)
is used as the variable node degree distribution for the first `− 1 iterations and the variable node degree
distribution with a singleton of unit mass at degree j is used for the final iteration. Let B`,j denote the
similar quantity for bit error probability obtained at the wiretapper. Then, we have es(`) =
∑dv
j=2A`,j λ˜j
and ew(`) =
∑dv
j=2B`,j λ˜j . Note that the values of A`,j and B`,j are obtained via density evolution. To
account for the availability of perfect information of the k bits corresponding to the key at the wiretapper’s
BP decoder, the intrinsic LLR distribution entered into the density evolution analysis for the wiretapper’s
decoder is set to be a mixture of the distribution of the channel outputs at the wiretapper (with the
quantized destination symbols as the channel input) and an impulse at +∞. The weights of the two
components in the mixture are determined by the value of Rk.
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Let  > 0 be a small prescribed error tolerance. Suppose that λ˜(x) satisfies the property that es(Ms) ≤ 
and ew(Mw) ≤ , for some integers Ms and Mw. Then, we can frame the Rc-maximizing code design
problem as the following linear program:
max
λ(x)
dv∑
j=2
λj
j
subject to
dv∑
j=2
λj = 1, λi ≥ 0 for 2 ≤ i ≤ dv,∣∣∣∣∣∣
dv∑
j=2
A`,jλj − es(`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ max[0, δ(es(`− 1)− es(`))], for 1 ≤ ` ≤Ms∣∣∣∣∣∣
dv∑
j=2
B`,jλj − ew(`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ max[0, δ(ew(`− 1)− ew(`))], for 1 ≤ ` ≤Mw
dv∑
j=2
A`,jλj ≤ es(`− 1), for 1 ≤ ` ≤Ms
dv∑
j=2
B`,jλj ≤ ew(`− 1), for 1 ≤ ` ≤Mw
where dv here is the maximum allowable degree of λ(x) and δ is a small positive number. The solution
λ(x) of the above linear program is then employed as the initial λ˜(x) for the next search round. The
search process continues this way until es(Ms) or ew(Mw) becomes larger than , or until λ(x) converges.
We can also fix λ(x) and obtain a similar linear programming problem for ρ(x). The iterative search can
then alternate between the linear programs for λ(x) and ρ(x), respectively.
The secret sharing irregular LDPC codes presented below are obtained from the code search proce-
dure described above starting with BSC-optimized LDPC codes, which are available from Urbanke’s
website [29]. Fig. 3 shows the (Rk, Rl)-trajectory achieved by a rate-0.25 secret sharing irregular LDPC
code obtained by performing the above search with Rk set to 0.155 for the BPSK-constrained Gaussian
wiretap channel when P/σ2 = −1.5 dB and α2 = 0 dB. The degree distribution pair of this secret
sharing irregular LDPC code is shown in Table I. We obtain an instance of the irregular code by randomly
generating a bipartite graph which satisfies the two given degree-distribution constraints. Similar to the
case of regular codes, the block length n = 105, and all length-4 loops are removed. Each shown (Rk, Rl)
pair is obtained in the same manner as described in Section V-A by using (11). From Fig. 3, we observe
that the pair (Rk, Rl) = (0.155, 0.025) gives the lowest leakage rate achievable by this secret sharing
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irregular LDPC code. For comparison, we also plot in Fig. 3 the (Rk, Rl)-trajectory achieved by the
proposed secret sharing scheme using a rate-0.25 BSC-optimized irregular LDPC code in place of the
secret sharing irregular LDPC code obtained from the code search described above. Note that since the
channel from the (quantized) destination to the source is a BSC, the use of the BSC-optimized LDPC
code is essentially the same as the reconciliation method proposed in [18]. For the BSC-optimized code,
the pair (Rk, Rl) = (0.2, 0.071) gives the lowest achievable leakage rate.
Similarly, Fig. 4 shows the secrecy performance of the proposed scheme when P/σ2 = −4.9 dB and
α2 = 5 dB. A rate-0.12 secret sharing irregular LDPC code is obtained by fixing Rk to 0.06 in the code
search. The degree distribution pair of this secret sharing irregular LDPC code is also shown in Table I. We
observe that the lowest leakage rate achieved by this code is given by the pair (Rk, Rl) = (0.062, 0.019).
Again, for comparison, the (Rk, Rl)-trajectory achieved by replacing the secret sharing irregular LDPC
code obtained from the code search with a rate-0.12 BSC-optimized irregular LDPC code is also shown
in Fig. 4. For the BSC-optimized irregular LDPC code, the pair (Rk, Rl) = (0.095, 0.052) gives the
lowest achievable leakage rate. In conclusion, the secret sharing irregular LDPC codes obtained from the
proposed code search procedure significantly outperform, in terms of secrecy performance, secret sharing
regular LDPC codes with small node degrees as well as irregular LDPC codes that are optimized just
for information reconciliation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we developed schemes based on LDPC codes to allow a source and a destination to share
secret information over a BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel. In the proposed secret sharing
schemes, the source first sends a random BPSK symbol sequence to the destination through the Gaussian
wiretap channel. Then, the destination generates a syndrome of its quantized received sequence using
an LDPC code and sends this syndrome back to the source via the public channel. Finally, the source
performs decoding to recover the quantized destination sequence based on its transmitted sequence, as
well as the syndrome that it receives from the destination. The secret key is obtained as the index of a
coset in a quotient space of the LDPC code.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed secret sharing scheme, we employed an upper bound
on the leakage information rate that depends on the decoding error probabilities of the decoder at the
source and of a fictitious decoder at the wiretapper, which observes the wiretapper received sequence,
the syndrome in the public channel as well as the secret key. The design was then converted to making
these error probabilities small. For a suitably chosen ensemble of regular LDPC codes, we showed that
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these error probabilities can indeed be made vanishing, as the block length increases, by ML decoding.
As a result, this established that the key capacity of the BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel can
be achieved by employing the secret sharing regular LDPC code ensemble in the proposed scheme.
Considering the practical constraints of finite block length and using BP decoding instead of ML
decoding, we employed a density-evolution based linear program to search for good irregular LDPC
codes that can be used in the secret sharing scheme. Simulation results showed that the secret sharing
irregular LDPC codes obtained from our search can get relatively close to the relaxed key capacity of the
BPSK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel, significantly outperforming regular LDPC codes as well as
irregular LDPC codes that are optimized just for information reconciliation.
Finally, we point out that the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 can be modified to show the
existence of an LDPC code (from the same regular LDPC code ensemble considered in Section IV) that
achieves the secrecy capacity [1], [3] of the Gaussian wiretap channel with the BPSK source-symbol
constraint. The code search approach described in Section V-B can also be employed to find irregular
LDPC codes that give secrecy performance close to the boundary of the secrecy-equivocation rate region
of that channel.
APPENDIX I
SKETCH OF PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof of [21, Theorem 2.1], which corresponds to the case when Rl = 0, can be easily extended
to accommodate Conditions 2 and 3 in the definition of achievable key-leakage rate pair.
First, consider the converse proof. Any permissible secret sharing strategy that achieves the key-leakage
rate pair (R,Rl) must satisfy (cf. [21, Eqn. (7)])
R <
1
1− ε
[
1
n
I(K;L) +
1
n
+ ε2
]
+ ε. (12)
From Conditions 2, 3, and the chain rule, we have
1
n
I(K;L) ≤ 1
n
I(K;L|Zn,Φt,Ψt) + 1
n
I(K;Zn|Φt,Ψt) + 1
n
I(K; Φt,Ψt)
≤ 1
n
I(K;L|Zn,Φt,Ψt) +Rl + 2ε ≤ 1
n
n∑
j=1
I(Xj ;Yj |Zj) +Rl + 2ε,
where the last inequality is due to the bound I(K;L|Zn,Φt,Ψt) ≤∑nj=1 I(Xj ;Yj |Zj) which is shown
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in [11, pp. 1129–1130]. Similarly, using the chain rule and Condition 2, we also have
1
n
I(K;L) ≤ 1
n
I(K;L|Φt,Ψt) + 1
n
I(K; Φt,Ψt)
≤ 1
n
I(K;L|Φt,Ψt) + ε ≤ 1
n
n∑
j=1
I(Xj ;Yj) + ε,
where the last inequality is due to the bound I(K;L|Φt,Ψt) ≤ ∑nj=1 I(Xj ;Yj), which again can be
shown by a simple modification to [11, pp. 1129–1130].
As in [21], let Q be a uniform random variable that takes value from {1, 2, . . . , n} and is independent
of all other random quantities. Define (X´, Y´ , Z´) = (Xj , Yj , Zj) if Q = j. Then pY´ ,Z´|X´(y´, z´|x´) =
pY,Z|X(y´, z´|x´). Combining the two upper bounds on 1nI(K;L) above, we have
1
n
I(K;L) ≤ min
{
I(X´; Y´ |Z´, Q) +Rl, I(X´; Y´ |Q)
}
+ 2ε
≤ min
{
I(X´; Y´ |Z´) +Rl, I(X´; Y´ )
}
+ 2ε. (13)
The power constraint (1) implies that E[|X´|2] ≤ P . Combining (12) and (13), we obtain
R <
1
1− ε
[
min
{
I(X´; Y´ |Z´) +Rl, I(X´; Y´ )
}
+ 2ε+
1
n
]
. (14)
Since ε can be arbitrarily small, (14) implies the converse result, i.e.,
R ≤ min
{
I(X´; Y´ |Z´) +Rl, I(X´; Y´ )
}
≤ max
X:E[|X|2]≤P ]
min {I(X;Y |Z) +Rl, I(X;Y )}
= max
X:E[|X|2]≤P ]
min {I(X;Y )− I(Y ;Z) +Rl, I(X;Y )} ,
where the last line is due to the fact that p(y, z|x) = p(y|x)p(z|x).
The achievability proof based on random Wyner-Ziv coding in [21, Section 4] can be used to achieve
the Rl-relaxed key capacity with proper modifications. Since the code construction statement in [21,
Section 4] is rather long, we only point out here the steps that are different for the current case due to
space limitation. The other details of the proof can be found in [21]. We also adopt the notation of [21]
for easy reference.
First, fix the source distribution p(x) that achieves the maximum in the Rl-relaxed key capacity
expression. If Rl < I(Y ;Z), then modify the code construction in [21, Section 4] with the new definitions
of R3 = I(X; Yˆ )− I(Yˆ ;Z) +Rl − ε and R4 = I(Yˆ ;Z)−Rl − 17ε. Note the p(yˆ|y) should be chosen
to make these rates positive. The asymptotic negligibility of 1nI(K; J) conditioned on the code Cn used
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in [21, Section 4] is the only argument needed in this case that is not explicitly shown in [21, Section
4]. We assume below that the code Cn is used. To establish that, first similar to (73) of [21] , we have
I(K; J) ≤ I(L; J) + 8nεR3 + 1. (15)
by using an argument similar to that of (73) of [21]. Then for j = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR2 and l = 1, 2, . . . , 2nR3 ,
we have
Pr{J = j, L = l} =
2nR4∑
w=1
Pr
{
M = j + (l − 1)2nR2 + (w − 1)2n(R2+R3)
}
≤ 2
−n(R2+R3−7ε)
1− ε < 2
−n(R2+R3−8ε)
for sufficiently large n, where the first inequality is from [21, Part 3 of Lemma 6]. In other words,
H(J, L) > n(R2 + R3 − 8ε) for sufficiently large n. Hence, together with the facts H(L) < nR3 and
H(J) < nR2, we have
I(L; J) = H(L) +H(J)−H(J, L) ≤ nR3 + nR2 − n(R2 +R3 − 8ε) = 8nε.
Putting this bound back to (15), we obtain 1nI(K; J) ≤ 8ε(R3 +1)+ 1n . Since ε can be chosen arbitrarily,
we establish the achievability of the relaxed key capacity. On the other hand, if Rl ≥ I(Y ;Z), the code
construction described above can be trivially modified to achieve the relaxed key capacity by setting
R4 = 0 and R3 arbitrarily close to I(X; Yˆ ).
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
As mentioned in the proof of Theorem 2, we adapt the proof of [25, Theorem 3] to prove this lemma.
The main argument is to establish that there is a secret sharing (dv, dc)-regular LDPC code ensemble
(C,W) for which the ensemble average error probabilities ¯s and ¯w simultaneously vanish as n increases
under the assumptions stated in the lemma.
To that end, we first examine the average weight spectra of the code C and subspace W in the LDPC
code ensemble:
Lemma 2: Consider the ensemble of (n, l, k) secret sharing code (C,W) described in Section IV. For
0 < m ≤ n, let S¯m and T¯m be the average numbers of codewords of Hamming weight m in C and W ,
respectively. Then, we have
S¯m =
(
n
m
)
Pr(xn ∈ C|w(xn) = m) (16)
T¯m =
2l−k − 1
2l − 1 · S¯m ≤ 2
−kS¯m (17)
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where w(xn) is the Hamming weight of xn.
Proof: Eqn. (16), given in [25], is obvious. It is also clear from the description of the code ensemble
in Section IV that
T¯m =
(
n
m
)
Pr(xn ∈ W|x ∈ C, w(xn) = m) · Pr(xn ∈ C|w(xn) = m)
= S¯m · Pr(xn ∈ W|xn ∈ C, w(xn) = m). (18)
Consider any xn0 6= 0n ∈ C,
Pr(xn0 ∈ W|xn0 ∈ C) =
number of (l − k)-dimensional subspaces in C that contain xn0
number of (l − k)-dimensional subspaces in C .
The number of (l−k)-dimensional subspaces in C is
l−k∏
u=1
2l−u+1 − 1
2l−k−u+1 − 1 (see [30, Theorem 7.1]). Further,
let X0 = {0n, xn0}, and let C′ = C/X0 be the quotient of C by X0. Then C′ is a (l − 1)-dimensional
linear space. If W is an (l − k)-dimensional subspace in C that contains xn0 , then W ′ = W/X0 is an
(l−k−1)-dimensional subspace in C′. On the other hand, suppose that W ′ is an (l−k−1)-dimensional
subspace in C′. Then W = ∪wn+X0∈W ′ wn + X0 is an (l − k)-dimensional subspace in C that contains
xn0 . It is also easy to see that the correspondence between W ′ and W above is one-to-one. As a result,
the number of (l − k)-dimensional subspaces in C that contain xn0 must be the same as the number of
(l − k − 1)-dimensional subspaces in C′, i.e.,
l−k−1∏
u=1
2l−u − 1
2l−k−u − 1 . So we have
Pr(xn0 ∈ W|xn0 ∈ C) =
2l−k − 1
2l − 1
for all xn0 6= 0 ∈ C. This implies
Pr(xn ∈ W|xn ∈ C, w(xn) = m) = 2
l−k − 1
2l − 1 ≤ 2
−k
for 0 < m ≤ n. Putting this back into (18), we obtain (17).
For C chosen uniformly from the (dv, dc)-regular LDPC code ensemble as described in Section IV, an
upper bound on Pr(xn ∈ C|w(xn) = m) is also available in [25, Lemma 2]:
• If mdv is odd, Pr(xn ∈ C|w(xn) = m) = 0.
• If mdv is even and mdv ≤ 2(n− l), Pr(xn ∈ C|w(xn) = m) ≤
(
n− l
mdv
2
)[
mdv
2(n− l)
]mdv
.
• If mdv is even, Pr(xn ∈ C|w(xn) = m) ≤ [(n− l)dc + 1] ·
[
1 +
(
1− 2mn
)dc
2
]n−l
.
In addition, Pr(xn ∈ C|w(xn) = m) = Pr(xn ∈ C|w(xn) = n −m) (and hence S¯n−m = S¯m) if dc is
even.
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Next, we employ Lemma 2 and the combined union and Shulman-Feder bound in [25, Theorem 1] to
bound ¯s and ¯w. To bound ¯w, consider the channel with Y˜ n as input and Zn as output. First, note that
Y˜ n contains i.i.d. equally likely binary elements. Hence, this channel is a memoryless BISO channel, and
is specified by the conditional pdf pZ|Y˜ (z|y˜) = pZ|X(z|1)pX|Y˜ (1|y˜) + pZ|X(z| − 1)pX|Y˜ (−1|y˜). Since
EnS + Xˆ
n
0 +W is a coset and the channel is memoryless BISO, it suffices to assume Y˜ n = X˜n0 ∈ W .
In addition, note that all possible X˜n0 sequences are equally likely. Now, let K˜ =
6
dv
ln dv1−Rc and β¯ =
2(1−Rc)
dv
e−12−K˜ . For any β¯ < γ < 12 , applying the bound in [25, Theorem 1] to the subcode W , the
ensemble average decoding error probability of the ML decoder at the wiretapper can be upper-bounded
as
¯w ≤
τ1 + τ2 + 2
−nEwr (Rc−Rk+ 1n log2 αw) for odd dc
τ1 + τ2 + τ3 + τ4 + τ5 + 2
−nEwr (Rc−Rk+ 1n log2 αw) for even dc,
(19)
where τ1 =
∑β¯n
m=1 T¯mD
m
w , τ2 =
∑γn
m=β¯n+1
T¯mD
m
w , τ3 =
∑n−β¯n−1
m=n−γn T¯mD
m
w , τ4 =
∑n−1
m=n−β¯n T¯mD
m
w ,
τ5 = T¯nD
n
w, Dw =
∫ √
pZ|Y˜ (z|1) · pZ|Y˜ (z| − 1) dz,
αw =

maxm∈{γn+1,...,n} T¯m2l−k−1 · 2
n
(nm)
for odd dc
maxm∈{γn+1,...,n−γn−1} T¯m2l−k−1 · 2
n
(nm)
for even dc,
and Ewr (R) = maxq max0≤ρ≤1{Ew0 (ρ, q)− ρR} is the random coding error exponent with
Ew0 (ρ, q) = − log2
∫ [
q(1)pZ|Y˜ (z|1)1/(1+ρ) + q(−1)pZ|Y˜ (z| − 1)1/(1+ρ)
]1+ρ
dz,
and q is the probability mass function (pmf) of the channel input Y˜ . It is known that the optimal q is
q(1) = q(−1) = 0.5.
Employing Lemma 2 and the bound on Pr(xn ∈ C|w(xn) = m) that follows (see also [25, Lemma
2]), it is not hard to further bound the various terms in (19):
τ1 ≤
2
−nRk n1−dv/2 (1−Rc)−dv/2 Dw1−Dw
(dv/2)dv
(dv/2)!
for even dv
2−nRk n2−dv (1−Rc)−dv D
2
w
2(1−D2w)
(dv)2dv
dv!
for odd dv,
log2 τ2
n
≤ 1
n
{log2 n+ log2[(n− k)dc + 1]} −Rk
+ max
β¯≤x≤γ
{
x log2Dw +H2(x) + (1−Rc)
(
log2[1 + (1− 2x)dc ]− 1
)}
,
and for even dc,
τ4 =
β¯n∑
m=1
T¯mD
m
wD
n−2m
w ≤ τ1Dn(1−2β¯)w ,
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log2 τ3
n
≤ log2 τ2
n
+ (1− 2γ) log2Dw,
and
τ6 ≤ 2−nRkDnw = 2−n(Rk−log2Dw).
Also,
log2 αw
n
≤

1
n
{1 + log2[(n− l)dc + 1]}+ (1−Rc) max
γ≤x≤1
log2[1 + (1− 2x)dc ] for odd dc
1
n
{1 + log2[(n− l)dc + 1]}+ (1−Rc) max
γ≤x≤1−γ
log2[1 + (1− 2x)dc ] for even dc
≤ 1
n
{1 + log2[(n− l)dc + 1]}+ (1−Rc) log2[1 + (1− 2γ)dc ].
For bounding ¯s, note that the channel with Y˜ n as input and Xn as output is a memoryless BSC and is
specified by the conditional pmf pX|Y˜ (x|y˜) = pY˜ |X(y˜|x). Again, since EnS +C is a coset and the channel
is memoryless BISO, it suffices to assume Y˜ n = Xn0 ∈ C. With this identification, the resulting bound
on ¯s follows the same line of arguments as above, and is essentially given in [25]. We summarize the
bound below for later reference:
¯s ≤
σ1 + σ2 + 2
−nEsr(Rc+ 1n log2 αs) for odd dc
σ1 + σ2 + σ3 + σ4 + σ5 + 2
−nEsr(Rc+ 1n log2 αs) for even dc,
(20)
where
σ1 ≤
n
1−dv/2 (1−Rc)−dv/2 Ds1−Ds
(dv/2)dv
(dv/2)!
for even dv
n2−dv (1−Rc)−dv D
2
s
2(1−D2s)
(dv)2dv
dv!
for odd dv,
log2 σ2
n
≤ 1
n
{log2 n+ log2[(n− l)dc + 1]}
+ max
β¯≤x≤γ
{
x log2Ds +H2(x) + (1−Rc)
(
log2[1 + (1− 2x)dc ]− 1
)}
,
and for even dc,
σ4 =
β¯n∑
m=1
T¯mD
m
s D
n−2m
s ≤ σ1Dn(1−2β¯)s ,
log2 σ3
n
≤ log2 σ2
n
+ (1− 2γ) log2Ds,
σ5 ≤ Dns = 2n log2Ds ,
and
log2 αs
n
≤ 1
n
{1 + log2[(n− l)dc + 1]}+ (1−Rc) log2[1 + (1− 2γ)dc ],
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with Ds = 2
√
pX|Y˜ (1|1) · pX|Y˜ (1| − 1), and Esr(R) = maxq max0≤ρ≤1{Es0(ρ, q) − ρR} is the random
coding error exponent of the channel of interest based on
Es0(ρ, q) = − log2
{[
q(1)pX|Y˜ (1|1)1/(1+ρ) + q(−1)pX|Y˜ (1| − 1)1/(1+ρ)
]1+ρ
+
[
q(1)pX|Y˜ (−1|1)1/(1+ρ) + q(−1)pX|Y˜ (−1| − 1)1/(1+ρ)
]1+ρ}
.
Recall that Rc < Cs(β˜) and Rc−Rk < Cw(β˜). Choose ε > 0 small enough such that Rc+2ε < Cs(β˜)
and Rc −Rk + 2ε < Cw(β˜). For any 0 < γ < 0.5, there exist large enough dv and dc such that
1) dvdc = 1−Rc,
2) 0 < β¯ < γ,
3) K˜ < ε, and
4) log2
[
1 + (1− 2γ)dc] < ε.
With this choice of (dv, dc), we have
max
β¯≤x≤γ
{
H2(x) + (1−Rc)
(
log2[1 + (1− 2x)dc ]− 1
)}
≤ H2(γ) + (1−Rc)
{
log2[1 + (1− 2β¯)dc ]− 1
}
≤ H2(γ) + (1−Rc)
[
log2
(
1 + e−2dcβ¯
)
− 1
]
≤ H2(γ) + (1−Rc)
[
log2
(
1 + e−4e
−12−ε
)
− 1
]
for any 0 < γ < 0.5, where the second inequality follows from the inequality 1 − 2x < e−2x and the
last inequality follows from the definition of β¯. Hence, we can make
max
β¯≤x≤γ
{
H2(x) + (1−Rc)
(
log2[1 + (1− 2x)dc ]− 1
)}
< 0
by choosing γ small enough since Cs(β˜) ≤ 1. Thus for sufficiently large n, we get the following results,
1) 1n log2 τ2 < 0 and
1
n log2 τ3 < 0,
2) 1n log2 σ2 < 0 and
1
n log2 σ3 < 0,
3) Rc −Rk + 1n log2 αw ≤ Rc −Rk + (1−Rc)ε+ ε < Cw(β˜), and
4) Rc + 1n log2 αs ≤ Rc + (1−Rc)ε+ ε < Cs(β˜).
Further, by the well known fact that the random coding exponent is positive if its rate argument is below
channel capacity, we obtain the stated asymptotic behaviors of ¯s and ¯w.
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TABLE I
DEGREE DISTRIBUTION PAIRS OF THE RATE-0.25 AND RATE-0.12 SECRET SHARING IRREGULAR LDPC CODES OBTAINED
FROM THE CODE SEARCH PROCESS DESCRIBED IN SECTION V-B.
rate-0.25 rate-0.12
λ2 0.2807 0.3651
λ3 0.1490 0.1610
λ4 0.0725
λ5 0.1081
λ6 0.0540
λ7 0.0599
λ8 0.1343
λ11 0.1123
λ12 0.0057
λ21 0.0697
λ22 0.0872
λ28 0.0650
λ29 0.0403
λ70 0.0006
λ71 0.0264
λ72 0.1197
λ87 0.0806
λ88 0.0799
ρ4 0.9705
ρ5 0.4637 0.0295
ρ6 0.5363
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Fig. 1. Comparison between the relaxed key capacities Cb and Cbq for different values of maximum allowable leakage rate
Rl over the BSPK-constrained Gaussian wiretap channel. For Cbq , symbol-by-symbol hard-decision quantization is imposed at
the destination.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Rl(bpcu)
R k
 o
r C
bq
 (b
pc
u)
Proposed scheme:
rate−0.25 (3,4)−regular LDPC code
Cbq at P/σ
2 = −0.15 dB, α2 = 0dB
Proposed scheme:
rate−0.4 (3,5)−regular LDPC code
[15] : (3,5)−/(1,3)−regular 
LDPC code
Cbq at P/σ
2 = 2 dB, α2 = 0dB
Fig. 2. Plot of the (Rk, Rl)-trajectories achieved by the proposed secret sharing scheme employing secret sharing regular
LDPC codes (C,W) with block length of 105. Two cases are shown in the figure. The green curve corresponds to the case of
P/σ2 = −0.15 dB, α2 = 0 dB, and C is a rate-0.25 (3, 4)-regular LDPC code. The brown curve corresponds to the case of
P/σ2 = 2 dB, α2 = 0 dB, and C is a rate-0.4 (3, 5)-regular LDPC code. For comparison, the corresponding boundary of the
(Cbq, Rl) region for each case is also included in the figure. For the second case, the (Rk, Rl) rate pair achieved by the scheme
proposed in [15] is denoted by the square symbol. The code used in that scheme is obtained by concatenating the (3, 5)-regular
LDPC parity-check matrix and another (1, 3)-regular LDPC parity-check matrix.
30
0 0.05 0.1 0.15
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Rl(bpcu)
R k
 o
r C
bq
 (b
pc
u)
Proposed scheme:
rate−0.25 irregular LDPC code
Cbq at P/σ
2 = −1.5dB, α2 = 0dB
BSC optimized:
rate−0.25 irregular LDPC code
Fig. 3. Plot (with circle markers) of the (Rk, Rl)-trajectory achieved by the proposed secret sharing scheme employing the
rate-0.25 secret sharing irregular LDPC code obtained from the code search process described in Section V-B. The block length
is set to 105. The channel parameter setting of P/σ2 = −1.5 dB and α2 = 0 dB is assumed. The boundary of the (Cbq, Rl)
region for this set of channel parameters is included in the figure. The (Rk, Rl)-trajectory achieved by the proposed secret sharing
scheme employing a standard rate-0.25 BSC-optimized irregular LDPC code instead is also plotted (with square markers) for
comparison.
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Fig. 4. Plot (with circle markers) of the (Rk, Rl)-trajectory achieved by the proposed secret sharing scheme employing the
rate-0.12 secret sharing irregular LDPC code obtained from the code search process described in Section V-B. The block length
is set to 105. The channel parameter setting of P/σ2 = −4.9 dB and α2 = 5 dB is assumed. The boundary of the (Cbq, Rl)
region for this set of channel parameters is included in the figure. The (Rk, Rl)-trajectory achieved by the proposed secret sharing
scheme employing a standard rate-0.12 BSC-optimized irregular LDPC code instead is also plotted (with square markers) for
comparison.
